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Chapter 8.  
Confronting Maritime Crime in Southeast Asian Waters:  
Re-examining ‘Piracy’ in the 21st Century 
 
Sam Bateman 
 
 
There is nothing new about maritime crime in Southeast Asia. It has a 
long history and the maritime criminals of today are mainly descendants of the 
marauders, pirates, and bandits of yesteryear. However, changes to the extent 
and nature of maritime crime have occurred over the years. The decline in fish 
stocks and loss of access to traditional fishing grounds, along with general 
economic problems, has led to unemployment and loss of income in coastal 
villages throughout the region. This has, in turn, forced some villagers to turn 
to piracy, sea robbery, and other forms of maritime crime. However, these 
villagers are often just the “foot soldiers” organized by opportunistic 
businessmen or criminal gangs.   
Most criminal groups—including so-called pirates—engage in several 
different types of criminal activity. There is no strict demarcation between 
people involved in piracy and those involved in other forms of maritime 
crime. Many are non-professional criminals, such as fishermen and traditional 
barter traders, engaged in low-level crime, making money by, for example, 
                                                 
 Some parts of this chapter are based on field research and interviews in Kuala Lumpur, 
Jakarta, Manila, and Singapore in October-November 2006, conducted by the author and Mr. 
John McFarlane, Visiting Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian 
National University, for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Mr McFarlane’s input is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
smuggling cigarettes from Indonesia to Malaysia to avoid paying excise taxes. 
The networks involved are not large, and tend to be family or village oriented.  
Smuggling has been going on for generations and continues to the present 
day, especially where people on both sides of modern borders share the same 
ethnicity and family ties. 
Transnational organized crime has also increased across Southeast 
Asia. Processes of globalization, convenient international travel, information 
processing, electronic transfers of funds, and ready access to secure 
communications have facilitated transnational crime just as much in Southeast 
Asia as they have elsewhere in the world. Due to the archipelagic geography 
of the region and the difficulties of policing sea routes and maritime borders, 
the sea is the main medium for the illegal movement of people and goods. 
Hence, organized crime in Southeast Asia invariably has a significant 
maritime dimension. 
“Legitimacy” for maritime crime is sometimes provided by political or 
religious causes, as well as by the developments in globalization that might 
facilitate transnational collusion between different radical groups and 
separatist movements. What might have been purely local causes in the past 
can now more readily take on a global dimension. In many instance also, 
colonial lines of demarcation cut across traditional family and ethnic 
groupings, and much of today’s illegal activity at sea, particularly smuggling 
and illegal people movement, is only “illegal” by virtue of contemporary, 
rather than traditional, border controls and trade regulations. 
Recent concerns with maritime crime in Southeast Asia has been with 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. Such activities have provoked 
international interest as they are assessed as threats to the free movement of 
shipping and seaborne trade. They have also led to speculation that because 
piracy and sea robbery occur in the region, there could be a higher risk of 
maritime terrorist attack. However, there are few grounds to conflate piracy 
and maritime terrorism.1 With hindsight also, it may be argued that the risks 
posed by piracy and sea robbery to international shipping in the region have 
been exaggerated. 
The focus on measures to reduce risks of piracy and sea robbery in the 
region has served to distort the picture with maritime crime more generally. It 
ignores the links between different kinds of maritime crime and that the 
perpetrators of different criminal activities at sea are often one and the same. 
It has also led to a concentration on patrolling at sea, which at best is a 
deterrent measure, rather than on policing activities onshore. This chapter 
examines the “bigger picture” by examining all forms of maritime crime in 
Southeast Asia, rather than just focusing on piracy and sea robbery, and 
suggests some possible actions to deal with the entire range of maritime 
crime. 
                                                 
1 Adam Young and Mark J. Valencia, “Conflation of Piracy and Terrorism in Southeast Asia: 
Rectitude and Utility,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.25, No.2, August 2003, 269-283. 
 
Maritime Crime in Southeast Asia  
 
People in the coastal villages of Sumatra, Java, Malaysia, the Riau 
Islands, and the Sulu Archipelago have a tradition of what is regarded by 
modern standards as maritime criminality. They have long been involved in 
piracy, smuggling, piracy, and trafficking in commodities and people. 
International borders in these areas were unknown in the past, although there 
would have been long-standing recognition of where the limits of traditional 
lands, waters or rights existed. 
The practice of smuggling, trafficking, and seeking employment away 
from home areas has not stopped, merely because colonial and post-colonial 
administrations have established national borders.  In addition, in many areas, 
the people on both sides of a modern border—for example, between Sumatra 
and peninsula Malaysia, or between Sabah and the southern Philippines—may 
be closely related, speak the same language, and have far more in common 
with each other than the administration in their faraway national capitals.   
There is still a tradition of unregulated cross-border movement by 
local people wherever border demarcation is uncertain and the means of 
enforcing it are weak. For example, a family group wishing to visit relatives 
across the sea may not bother about the formality of border controls, and 
understandably may take “gifts” along with them. Much of this activity is 
relatively harmless but it can assume more dangerous proportions, particularly 
when drugs or arms are involved.   
Smuggling and the movement of people both have a long history in 
Southeast Asia. It is frequently regarded as an extension of the historic trading 
arrangements between neighbours that is still conducted through the barter 
trading system. It is particularly prevalent in the Sulu Sea area and the 
Malacca Strait. Effective bilateral or trilateral cooperation in the area appears 
limited.  There are difficulties in intercepting and arresting people engaged in 
smuggling and illegal border crossings.  
Smuggling in the Sulu Sea area has been increasing rapidly, 
particularly from the Philippine side. It involves cigarettes, illegal immigrants, 
sex trafficking, and other valuable commodities, including drugs. There is also 
widespread smuggling of subsidized diesoline and kerosene from Malaysia to 
Indonesia, particularly through Penang.2 Other smuggled goods include 
alcohol and motorcycles. Traditional fishermen might undertake the 
smuggling, but the real masterminds are located on shore and keep themselves 
at “arms length” from the illegal activity.   
Illegal people movement in the region may be either short-term for 
family reunions or other social visits, or long-term mainly to seek work. 
Malaysia is particularly concerned about illegal migration by sea across the 
                                                 
2  Diesel is a very profitable commodity to smuggle from Malaysia to Indonesia.  At this 
stage, due to subsidies, diesel in Malaysia costs about 1/8 that in Indonesia.  As a result, there 
is a healthy diesel smuggling operation from peninsula Malaysia to Sumatra. Malaysian-based 
Taiwanese fishing boats and Malaysian fishing vessels are believed also to refuel other fishing 
vessels at sea. 
Malacca Strait from Indonesia or down the Strait from Thailand, Myanmar, or 
Bangladesh.3 With strong and long-standing traditional family links across the 
Malacca Strait and the Sulu Sea, people moving across colonial boundaries do 
not regard themselves as illegal immigrants. There is much traditional 
movement of people by sea between southern Philippines and Sabah, as well 
as the movement of people between Sumatra, Malaysia, and southern 
Thailand. These movements may be exploited both by criminal and terrorist 
groups.  
Registration of aliens is a significant problem in the Philippines, where 
there are many Indonesians, particularly in islands around Mindanao. There 
are known links between these people and smuggling and terrorist activities.  
The Philippines also has illegal immigrants from China and India who may be 
involved in the sale of smuggled goods, financial crimes, and other forms of 
criminal activity. All types of smuggling in the Philippines are inter-related.  
Cross border regulation (including the regulation of ferry traffic), particularly 
in the Sulu Sea region, is weak. People move illegally into the Philippines 
from East Kalimintan through Sandakan and the Sulu archipelago to 
Zamboanga and elsewhere in Mindanao; and from Manado in North Sulawesi 
through the Greater Sunda Islands to General Santos and Cotabato in 
Mindanao. 
Drug and Arms Trafficking 
                                                 
3 Sumathy Permal, “Trafficking in the Strait of Malacca,” Maritime Studies 156, 
September/October 2007, 6. 
 
Trafficking in drugs by sea remains a major source of income for 
many transnational organized criminal groups. Myanmar remains the major 
source country for opiates—principally heroin—in Southeast Asia, but small 
amounts are also produced in Laos.4  Cannabis is trafficked in the region, 
especially to Malaysia.  Sometimes this has involved land routes, but more 
frequently it has involved transfers at sea, or simply floating the product 
ashore. Cannabis is also widely smuggled in the Philippines. The New 
Peoples’ Army (NPA) is active in cultivating cannabis, especially in the 
northern Philippines. 
There is an increasing problem in the region with the manufacture and 
trafficking in methamphetamines (“ice”) and other amphetamine type 
stimulants (ATS) from Myanmar and other Asia-Pacific countries, including 
China, India, and North Korea. “Ice” has replaced heroin as the most lethal 
drug in the region, and its manufacture and use is increasing.  Shabu 
(crystalline methamphetamine hydrochloride or ice) is the major drug of 
choice in the Philippines, with drug factories in the central Philippines, mainly 
resourced from China or Taiwan. This is a worrying trend because the 
physiological impact of “ice” is far more serious than that of heroin, cocaine, 
cannabis, ecstasy, or other ATS. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, which are 
                                                 
4 Some 90% of the world’s opium production is grown in Afghanistan, mainly in Helmand 
Province.  However, most of this product, in the form of heroin, is trafficked through Iran, the 
Caucuses, Central Asia and the Middle East into Russia and Europe.  It appears that very little 
Afghan heroin is trafficked into Southeast Asia and beyond. 
major precursor chemicals for the manufacture of methamphetamines and 
other ATS, are manufactured in China and India, and moved mostly by sea.  
Small arms trafficking in Southeast Asia is “an integral part of broader 
transnational crime that includes terrorism, drug trafficking, money 
laundering, piracy and human trafficking.”5 Small arms are widely available 
in the region and trafficking by sea is the preferred means of movement. Past 
conflicts in Indochina have provided a major source of small arms and light 
weapons. Thefts of weapons from military bases and police stations are 
common, particularly in Indonesia and the Philippines, and small arms are 
also manufactured both legally and illegally in the region, particularly again in 
the Philippines. 
Due to Thailand’s geographical characteristics, its role in the 
Cambodian conflict, and its relatively open society, Thailand is “an ideal point 
of origin and transit in the trafficking of small arms.”6 Because of the troubles 
in Aceh, the GAM was a major recipient of small arms and light weapons 
smuggled across the Malacca Strait from Thailand. Arms have also flowed to 
the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka through southern Thailand.7  A former 
Indonesian military officer was arrested in the United States in 2006 in 
                                                 
5 Rizal Sukma, “The Problem of Small Arms in Southeast Asia: An Overview,” in Philipe 
Jusario Vermonte (ed), Small is (not) beautiful: The problem of small arms in Southeast Asia, 
Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2004, 9.  
6 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Small Arms Trafficking in Southeast Asia: A Perspective from 
Thailand,” in Vermonte, Small is (not) beautiful, 60. 
7 Ibid., 67-68 
connection with arms smuggling to the LTTE in Sri Lanka.8 Sri Lanka 
remains concerned about Indonesia being a conduit for the smuggling of 
firearms from Southern Thailand to the LTTE.  
The Philippines has plenty of weapons available. These include 
domestically produced small arms and weapons stolen or “sold” from the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).  The domestic arms manufacturing 
industry produces weapons both legally and illegally, with some illegal 
exports to criminal groups in Japan and Korea.  The trade is managed by 
criminal syndicates and is largely carried by sea in containers rather than by 
small boat. A common route for terrorists, firearms, and explosives coming 
into Indonesia from the Philippines, through Sabah, is via Palu in Central 
Sulawesi, and then to Surabaya in Java (probably by boat) or onwards to 
Jakarta or other destinations in Indonesia. 
The proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a major factor 
underpinning the incidence of maritime crime in Southeast Asia. Illegal 
trafficking occurs across the Malacca Strait and the Andaman Sea from 
southern Thailand into Aceh, Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka, and is also 
prevalent into and out of the Philippines. Measures to control trafficking in 
small arms might assist in reducing the levels of violence used in acts of 
piracy and sea robbery. Given the proliferation of small arms and light 
                                                 
8 Brian White, “Six indicted in arms brokering for Tamil Tigers and Indonesia,” Associated 
Press, 29 September 2006. 
weapons in Southeast Asia, it is not surprising to find that pirates and armed 
robbers are making greater use of them.9 
 
The Threat of Illegal Fishing 
 
Illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing has become a 
serious problem in the region, especially for Indonesia.  With the depleted fish 
stocks in the region, many coastal villagers have lost their basic means of 
livelihood, and are tempted into illegal activity. With the devolution of powers 
to regional governments in Indonesia, there is less central oversight of 
fisheries enforcement.10 
The fishing industry in Malaysia is more sophisticated than that in 
Indonesia. As the fish stocks in the area are seriously depleted, Malaysian 
fishermen are tempted to cross into Indonesian claimed waters to exploit the 
fish stocks there, using their larger vessels and more sophisticated techniques. 
This exposes them to harassment, extortion, and arrest by Indonesian law 
enforcement officials who may be acting corruptly, as well as engaging in 
some “bush justice.” The experience of the Hutan Melintang fishing 
community suggests that the rate of these predations with the robbery and 
                                                 
9 Sam Bateman, Catherine Zara Raymond, Joshua Ho, Safety and Security in the Malacca and 
Singapore Straits—An Agenda for Action.  (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic 
Studies, May 2006), 25-26. 
10 Dirhamsyah, “Maritime Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia: Problems and 
Recommendations,” Maritime Studies 144, September/October 2005, 9. 
informal detentions of Malaysian fishermen and fishing vessels by Indonesian 
law enforcement personnel has not declined.11 
Illegal activity could involve the village or district tauke (towkay) 
system.  Tauke is a Chinese (Hokkien dialect) word for “boss” or “business 
proprietor.” Within each kampong, there is a recognized business leader, and 
the taukes manage the local fishing and other production sharing systems in 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, including in Aceh and 
the Riau Islands.  Taukes are invariably of Chinese ethnicity, reflecting the 
long involvement of ethnic Chinese in managing fishing activities in the 
Malacca Strait.12 They are usually the masterminds behind smuggling and 
other illegal maritime operations, even while they use the local villagers as 
“foot soldiers,” thus keeping themselves at “arms length” from the illegal 
activity. 
While the tauke is not necessarily the headman of the kampong, he 
effectively controls the “business” activities undertaken in the kampong.  
Some—but certainly not all—taukes have criminal associations, and they 
become the link through which more sophisticated organized crime might 
operate in, for example, people smuggling, cigarette or diesel smuggling, 
illegal fishing or piracy.  It is very difficult to counter the criminal role of the 
tauke because they have a very powerful position in the kampong and act as 
                                                 
11 J.N. Mak, “Pirates, Renegades, and Fishermen: Reassessing the Dynamics of Maritime 
Piracy in the Malacca Straits,” Paper presented at the Royal Australian Navy Sea Power 
Conference 2008, Sydney, 29-31 January 2008, 17.  
12 John G. Butcher, The Closing of the Frontier – A History of the Marine Fisheries of 
Southeast Asia c. 1850-2000, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004), 80-83. 
the link between the poor and the wealthy, the fishermen and the businessmen, 
and possibly, the criminals and the military. 
 
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea 
 
Although many types of maritime crime may be increasing, including 
smuggling of goods and people, piracy and armed robbery against ships in 
Southeast Asia has actually gone down significantly in recent years. For 
example, the “phantom ship” phenomenon, when a ship is hijacked and 
subsequently given a false identity and documentation prior to being sold or 
used for further trading, has been largely solved with the introduction of ship 
identification numbers (SINs) and continuous synoptic records (CSRs) by the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). Because of these international 
reforms, it has become much more difficult to give a ship a false identity. 
As mentioned above, the number of reported piracy attacks in the 
region has trended steadily downwards from 2004 to the present. Table 1 
shows the number of attacks (actual and attempted) in Southeast Asia for each 
year from 2000 to 2007. The large number of attacks in 2000, particularly in 
the Malacca Strait, may be attributed to two main factors. First, it may have 
been a consequence of the economic downturn of the late 1990s with more 
people turning to sea robbery for income, and secondly, several high profile 
pirate attacks in the late 1990s might have drawn increased attention to piracy, 
and this may have led to some increased reporting of incidents. 
 
Table 1 
Piracy in Southeast Asia – Actual and Attempted Attacks 
2000-2007 
 
Source: IMB, Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships – Annual Reports, 
Table 1 
 
 Reservations should be noted about the statistics from the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB). On the one hand, there could be some under-
reporting of attacks. Both the IMB and the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) have noted the reluctance by some shipmasters and ship 
owners to report incidents due to concerns that any investigation might disrupt 
the ship’s schedule, and insurance premiums might increase. Under-reporting 
may also occur because attacks on local craft, such as fishing boats, barges 
and small barter vessels may not be reported to the IMB.13 This under-
                                                 
13 Mak, 4. 
Location 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Cambodia/Vietnam 6 8 12 15 4 10 3 5 63
Indonesia 119 91 103 121 94 79 50 43 700
Malacca Strait 75 17 18 28 38 12 11 7 206
Malaysia 21 19 14 5 9 3 10 9 90
Philippines 9 8 10 12 4 0 6 6 55
Singapore Strait 5 7 5 2 8 7 5 3 42
Thailand 8 8 5 2 4 1 1 2 31
Myanmar/Burma 5 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
South China Sea 9 4 0 2 8 6 1 3 33
TOTAL 257 165 167 187 170 118 87 78 1229
reporting might, for example, partly explain the lack of reported attacks in the 
Philippines in 2005, as shown in Table 1. 
 On the other hand, over-reporting is also possible. Many incidents 
constitute either unsuccessful attempts to board or petty theft—of small items 
such as paint, mooring ropes, or outboard motors—from vessels in port or at 
anchor. These may previously have gone unreported, but are now reported due 
to the publicity given to this form of maritime crime and greater awareness of 
the reporting channels available. The IMB statistics may also be inflated by 
the propensity of ships to report any close approach by a small craft as an 
“attempted attack,” and by the lack of follow-up by the IMB to determine 
whether an attack was in fact an actual attack.14 
 There are several reasons for the improved situation. National and 
regional responses, including increased patrolling and surveillance, have been 
important, although operations at sea mainly have a deterrent effect and few 
pirates or sea robbers are actually caught at sea. Tighter government control 
and local policing onshore are other factors that have contributed to the 
improved situation, as well as greater awareness generally in the shipping 
industry of the importance of security, following the introduction of the 
                                                 
14 According to the IMB, the feeder container ship Sinar Merak was attacked on 22 January 
2007 in the Malacca Strait after leaving Belawan for Singapore. However, subsequent 
investigations by Singapore security agencies revealed that the two persons found onboard the 
Sinar Merak were actually innocent Indonesian fishermen who were survivors of a small craft 
that was run down by the container ship manoeuvring aggressively to avoid a suspected 
attack. Nevertheless, the IMB continues to show this incident as an actual attack in the 
Malacca Strait. ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre, Report for January 2007, Singapore, 
11.   
International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code adopted by the IMO 
in 2002. 
 The vast majority of attacks in the region are on vessels at anchor, in 
port or entering or leaving a harbor. For example, of the 78 actual and 
attempted attacks in 2007, 52 were on vessels that were not at sea. These 
attacks are usually of a minor nature and are best countered by more effective 
policing by port authorities, including active patrolling of ports and 
anchorages. Some international involvement through assistance with building 
the capacity of local authorities may be useful. 
Most high value seaborne trade in Southeast Asia is carried in larger 
vessels transiting the region, while the majority of successful attacks occur 
almost entirely on small vessels; most attacks are on smaller, more vulnerable 
vessels carrying trade within the region, or on local fishing and trading 
vessels, as well as cruising yachts. Larger vessels gain considerable protection 
from their size and speed. Most modern merchant ships engaged in 
international trade travel at speeds in excess of fourteen knots, and it is both 
difficult and dangerous for small craft to attempt to approach them at this 
speed. 
With the exception of security in some ports and anchorages, piracy 
and sea robbery in the region appears to be under control. The measures taken 
by regional countries both at sea and onshore have largely been effective 
although security in ports and anchorages in some countries, and policing 
generally against maritime crime, could still be improved. There are no 
grounds for the operational involvement of non-regional countries in 
providing security at sea against piracy and sea robbery in Southeast Asia. 
Nevertheless, contributions from non-regional countries would still assist in 
building the capacity of regional countries to provide security in ports, 
anchorages, and littoral waters. 
 
Maritime Terrorism 
 
In Southeast Asia, the vulnerability of the maritime sector to attack by 
terrorists has been of concern due to the economic importance of the sector; 
the incidence of piracy and sea robbery in the region; and the presence of 
terrorist groups with either a history of attacking maritime targets or possibly 
an intent to launch such attacks. Also, as target hardening occurs on land, 
maritime targets might become more attractive to terrorist groups. 
Possible scenarios in Southeast Asia range from highly speculative and 
most unlikely to credible.15 The more spectacular scenarios tend to be based 
on inadequate knowledge of the operating environment. Most commonly 
postulated is the notion that the Malacca and Singapore straits could be 
physically blocked. The traffic separation scheme (TSS) in the vicinity of One 
Fathom Bank off Port Klang in the Malacca Strait is 0.6 nautical miles wide 
                                                 
15  Sam Bateman, “Maritime Terrorism: Issues for the Asia-Pacific,” Security Challenges, 
Vol.2, No.3, October 2006, 77-92.  
and this is often identified as an area where the strait could be blocked. 
However, the distance from coast to coast outside the TSS is much greater and 
would still allow the passage of most vessels. The most likely cause of 
diverting traffic away from the straits would be if the shipping community 
considers the straits insecure, perhaps due a threat like sea mining, rather from 
than the physical blocking of passage.  
 The more catastrophic scenarios highlight possible attacks on liquid 
natural gas (LNG) or liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tankers, either through the 
planting of devices onboard or by the use of a tanker as a mobile weapon to 
strike secondary targets. Such attacks seem improbable due to the technical 
complexities involved, and the opportunity and expertise required for such an 
attack. Although such a scenario is unlikely, its potential is given 
disproportionate focus due to the results such an attack might produce. 
 The main maritime terrorist threat in the region is usually seen as coming 
from Al-Qaeda and its associated groups in Southeast Asia, particularly Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). These groups have camps in 
the southern Philippines where they train together and share expertise. Group 
members routinely move between Sabah, Indonesian Borneo, and these camps 
by speedboat, local craft, and ferries. The ASG in the Philippines has already 
shown that it can conduct bomb attacks against ships. It claimed responsibility 
for the Superferry 14 attack,16 and was blamed for the bomb attack on the ferry 
Dona Ramona in August 2005, as the ship was about to depart from 
Zamboanga.17 
 These attacks show that ferries, and potentially cruise liners, are 
vulnerable to attack. With passenger ships and ferries, it is not so much the bomb 
that might do the damage but rather the fire and panic that can follow an 
explosion with so many people in a relatively confined area.18 Measures to 
defeat attacks against ferries are a national responsibility involving for example, 
better screening of passengers and their luggage and enhanced security onboard. 
The potential for cooperation between pirates and terrorists is often 
overstated with writings that emphasize possible linkages between pirates and 
terrorists.19 Piracy and maritime terrorism might involve a similar modus 
operandi by the attackers, but piracy is conducted for private ends while 
terrorism has political motives. In assessments of the risk of maritime terrorism, 
pirates have been seen as having skills and expertise that might be attractive to a 
                                                 
16  The Superferry 14 sank in February 2004 near Manila after a bomb explosion and fire 
onboard. It constitutes the most serious act of maritime terrorism so far in terms of loss of life 
with 116 people killed or missing. Other attacks on ferries in Southeast Asia include the 
February 2000 bombing of the Philippine ferry Our Lady Mediatrix, which killed forty 
people; and the December 2001 bombing of the Indonesian ferry Kailifornia, which killed ten. 
John F. Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2005, Vol. 58, No. 3, 67. 
17 “Ferry Blast Injures 30 in Southern Philippines,” The New York Times online, 28 August 
2005. 
18  Sam Bateman, “Ferry Safety: A Neglected Aspect of Maritime Security?” IDSS 
Commentaries 31/2006, (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 3 May 2006). 
19 For example, Graham Gerard Ong, “Ships Can Be Dangerous, Too: Coupling Piracy and 
Terrorism in Southeast Asia’s Maritime Security Framework,” in Derek Johnson and Mark 
Valencia (eds), Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, (Singapore: Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), 45-76. 
terrorist group, but these are not particularly specialised and are readily 
available. There are many former naval personnel, fishermen, and commercial 
seafarers in Southeast Asia with knowledge and experience that could be used 
by a terrorist group. 
 
Regional Solutions to Maritime Crime 
 
Rather than seeing each of the different types of maritime crime 
mentioned in the preceding sections in isolation, the real challenge is to 
understand their root causes and to choose appropriate responses in a more 
holistic manner. Measures to control maritime crime in the region should not be 
focused solely on piracy prevention and the risks of maritime terrorism. 
Recognizing the interests of all stakeholders, they should also encompass other 
illegal activities at sea, such as the prevention of trafficking in arms, drugs, and 
people, as well as the operational dimensions of maritime safety, search and 
rescue (SAR), and marine environmental protection. 
There are relatively few agreed maritime boundaries in Southeast Asia. 
Of the nearly sixty maritime boundaries required in the region, less than 20% 
have so far been settled. Indonesia is one regional country that has very 
assiduously pursued agreements on maritime boundaries with its neighbors. In 
sharp contrast, the Philippines has no agreed maritime boundaries with any of its 
neighbors. Very few exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries have been 
drawn in the region. The lack of maritime boundaries complicates enforcement 
against crimes at sea generally, while the lack of EEZ boundaries makes 
enforcement against illegal fishing difficult.  
Little progress is being made with delimiting outstanding maritime 
boundaries in Southeast Asia. Reaching agreement on them is both necessary 
and difficult. Trilateral negotiations, and perhaps even multilateral negotiations, 
are required because some end points for the boundaries need to be agreed 
between three or more countries.20 Regional countries should move 
expeditiously to resolve existing maritime boundary disputes to ensure that 
jurisdiction can be exercised properly at sea. If boundaries cannot be resolved, 
countries should be prepared to enter into some form of provisional 
arrangements for the maintenance of law and order in the disputed area without 
prejudice to their positions in the boundary negotiations. Bilateral agreements 
between neighboring countries are essential for the reduction of illegal migration 
and smuggling. 
Because most likely maritime boundaries lack an historical basis, local 
cultural, social, and economic circumstances must also be recognized in 
border areas. Freedom of traditional movement and trade should be respected 
                                                 
20 When several countries are opposite and/or adjacent to each other, a bilateral boundary 
between any two of them will inevitably reach a point where it intersects with the claim of 
another country (or countries). This is the situation in most seas of Southeast Asia and in the 
Gulf of Thailand. A commonly applied principle is to terminate the agreed boundary near the 
point of intersection (a theoretical tripoint), and then leave the precise position of the tripoint 
to subsequent trilateral negotiations. Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime 
Political Boundaries of the World, 2nd ed., (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 312, 
in agreed border control arrangements rather than simply classifying these 
activities as smuggling or illegal people movement. 
 
National Maritime Law Enforcement 
 
Maritime jurisdiction and enforcement are extremely complex issues, 
particularly in areas where maritime boundaries are not agreed. This is a 
special problem in key regional hotspots for maritime crime, such as the 
Malacca and Singapore straits, and the Sulu and Celebes Seas. Crimes at sea 
are often transnational, with more than one national jurisdiction involved. A 
state’s criminal jurisdiction varies with the legal type of jurisdiction. This 
might be as a flag state over vessels flying its flag, as a coastal state over 
waters under national jurisdiction, as a port state over vessels in its internal 
waters, as an archipelagic or straits state, as a state of nationality of people or 
organizations engaged in illegal activities, or as a state exercising jurisdiction 
on the high seas as permitted by international law. 
Regional countries face difficulties in combating illegal activities at 
sea due to a shortage of trained personnel, a lack of modern equipment, the 
obsolescence or inadequacy of much national legislation, and the weak 
maritime law enforcement capability of national agencies.21 Problems also 
arise from the lack of interagency coordination and duplication of effort 
                                                 
21 The situation in Indonesia is discussed in detail in Dirhamsyah. 
between agencies; some regional countries, notably Indonesia and the 
Philippines, have a number of different agencies dealing with some areas of 
maritime security without adequate arrangements for coordination. Lastly, any 
form of investigation or intelligence collection in the coastal areas where 
criminal networks exist will be fraught with many difficulties, including 
personal risk to the police involved. 
As the largest archipelagic state in the world, Indonesia is very much 
aware of the extent of its maritime interests and of the need to protect its 
maritime sovereignty and to maintain law and order at sea. However, its 
efforts have been thwarted by the lack of capacity to conduct security 
operations, and by the lack of coordination between the various government 
agencies that have responsibility for some aspect of maritime enforcement. At 
least ten agencies have been identified as involved in maritime security 
management with nine authorized to conduct law enforcement operations at 
sea.22 The situation has been further complicated since the collapse of the 
Suharto Government by government reforms, including the autonomy laws 
that involve devolution of authority to provincial governments, including 
some responsibility for law enforcement at sea. Mak considers that “the 
Indonesian decentralization process has led not only to more autonomy for 
                                                 
22 Ibid., Table 1, 3. 
agencies such as the military and the police, but also to a greater lack of 
accountability.”23   
Malaysia has been most successful in recent years in dealing with 
piracy and sea robbery. It has largely overcome the difficulties of maintaining 
law and order in a large and diverse maritime area that includes parts of the 
Malacca Strait, the South China Sea, and the Sulu and Celebes Seas around 
East Malaysia. Unresolved obstacles to Malaysia’s security efforts include the 
lack of a full suite of maritime boundaries around East Malaysia, and of an 
EEZ boundary with Indonesia in the Malacca Strait. The lack of the latter 
boundary means that what Indonesia might regard as enforcement against 
illegal fishing by Malaysian vessels might be regarded as piracy by Malaysia. 
The Philippines is a large archipelagic country, which faces major 
problems in providing and maintaining control in its more remote island 
groups, particularly in the southern part of the country. Numerous small inlets 
and islands and a weak navy and coast guard add to the difficulties of 
providing an acceptable level of maritime security. The Philippines is 
particularly concerned about the illegal trade in small arms and light weapons, 
illegal migration, piracy, cross-border kidnappings, smuggling of narcotics, as 
well as precursor chemicals for narcotics and explosives.24 Fighting maritime 
crime is a task mainly for the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), although it 
                                                 
23 Mak, 18. 
24 Jesse M. Pascasio, “Developing a Sub-Regional Maritime Security Arrangement,” Paper 
for Fourth Meeting of CSCAP Study Group on Capacity Building for Maritime Security 
Cooperation held in Kuala Lumpur, 27-28 May 2006, 3. 
suffers in the competition for resources with other elements of the Philippine 
Armed Forces. 
 
Multilateral Law Enforcement 
 
Considerable progress has been made in Southeast Asia over recent 
years in developing regional responses to the threats of piracy and sea 
robbery, although cooperative measures to deal with other forms of maritime 
crime are less well developed. Cooperative operational arrangements in the 
Malacca and Singapore straits, such as MALSINDO (Malaysia, Singapore, 
Indonesia) to coordinate naval patrols, the “Eyes in the Sky” project to 
provide cooperative air surveillance, and a joint coordinating committee to 
oversee these arrangements are well established. However, the littoral states, 
especially Indonesia and Malaysia, remain firm that there is no role for the 
user states in patrolling the straits.25 Embryonic operational cooperation is 
also developing in the Sulu and Celebes Seas between Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and the Philippines. However, problems of governance, inter-agency 
coordination and the lack of resources remain, especially in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand. 
Another significant development is the IMO-sponsored meeting 
process on security, safety, and environmental protection arrangements in the 
                                                 
25 Ary Hermewan, “Malacca coast patrol to stay local,” The Jakarta Post, 26 August 2007. 
Malacca and Singapore straits. This began with the Jakarta meeting in 
September 2005 and continued with meetings in Kuala Lumpur in September 
2006 and in Singapore in September 2007. It provides a regular forum for 
dialogue between stakeholders, comprising the littoral countries, the user 
states, relevant international organizations, and the international shipping 
industry. The most recent meeting in Singapore agreed to establish a 
“Cooperative Mechanism” for navigational safety, security, and 
environmental protection in the straits, comprising a forum for regular 
dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage specific projects, and a fund 
to receive and manage voluntary financial contributions from the shipping 
industry and user states.26 
The ASEAN Chiefs of National Police (ASEANAPOL) meetings deal 
with the preventive, enforcement and operational aspects of cooperation 
against transnational crime, including piracy and all forms of smuggling, as 
well as matters relating to terrorism. However, the sharing of information and 
joint operational policing activity against maritime crime in the region 
remains underdeveloped.  This is partly due to a lack of trust and common 
accord between ASEAN countries and their dialogue partners, especially 
where issues of sovereignty or domestic sensitivities over organized crime and 
corruption may be involved. This is often the case as transnational crime 
investigations can easily conflict with the ASEAN principle of “non-
                                                 
26 “Milestone agreement reached on co-operation over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,” 
IMO Briefing 29/2007, 18 September 2007.  
interference in the internal affairs of one another.”27 Interstate cooperation 
against crime invariably requires some surrendering of sovereignty. Also, in 
some countries, corrupt officials may be directly or indirectly involved in the 
criminal activities, and thus will be reluctant to risk exposure through 
inquiries by external investigators. The lack of extradition treaties between 
regional countries is another fundamental problem. 
Despite much rhetoric, there has been some hesitancy at the Track One 
level in dealing too specifically with transnational organized crime in 
Southeast Asia. At the Track Two level, the Council for Security Cooperation 
in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) has had working groups and study groups dealing 
with some aspect of transnational crime. These groups have produced at least 
two memorandums dealing with transnational crime, which have helped in 
drawing attention to particular issues.28  
 
Problems of Securitization and Governance 
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Piracy and sea robbery have largely been securitized in the region.29 The 
threats have become the medium for new initiatives for collective and common 
security. But in effect, securitizing the problems of transnational crime has 
elevated them to the political level where grand statements can be made but little 
action occurs. As Emmers has observed, ASEAN “has failed to act upon the 
issue of transnational crime due to domestic factors, including the role of 
corruption, vested interests and a lack of resources, but also because of its own 
consensus model and in-built resistance to institutional reforms.”30 The ASEAN 
principle, already mentioned, of non-interference in each other’s affairs might be 
added to this list of factors. 
Securitizing the threat has also led to an environment of increased 
military spending whereby capabilities are acquired ostensibly to fight terrorism 
and piracy whereas the real purpose is more purely military. When developing 
countries in the region should be pursuing programs to drive down poverty and 
social unrest and remove root causes of piracy and terrorism, they are being 
pressed to increase defence spending to provide greater security, especially at 
sea. These militarized approaches have high opportunity costs and set back 
development initiatives that might alleviate root causes of criminal activity and 
                                                 
29 The process of securitisation has its origins in the Copenhagen School of Strategic Studies 
and the writings of people such as Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. It relates security to survival 
and establishes five categories of comprehensive security: military, environmental, economic, 
societal and political. Ralf Emmers, “ASEAN and the securitization of transnational crime in 
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social unrest. A law enforcement response to maritime crime is preferable to one 
based on the projection of military power. 
Lack of good governance is evident both in the causes of a breakdown in 
law and order at sea and in the ability of governments to deal with disorder when 
it occurs. And it seems that the further away is the seat of national government, 
the greater the problems of governance, including graft and corruption. These 
factors lead to increased maritime crime. For example, the barter trade between 
the southern Philippines and neighboring countries is unregulated, considerable 
quantities of dutiable goods are smuggled across borders, there is no patrolling 
of any strength in border areas, appropriate security legislation and regulations 
are not in place, and there is no effective national system for tracking small 
vessels used for criminal activity or stolen from other jurisdictions. 
Levels of governance over particular areas prone to criminal activities 
are other factors that have influenced the extent and nature of maritime crime in 
Southeast Asia. For example, between the World Wars, American authorities 
appear to have exercised fairly effective control in the Sulu archipelago. More 
recently however, lower standards of governance have led to an apparent 
upsurge in maritime crime in this area, notably armed robbery, kidnappings, and 
smuggling. Social unrest, nationalism, and political extremism, as well as porous 
and inadequately controlled maritime borders, add new dimensions to the 
situation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A re-examination of the contemporary situation with piracy and sea 
robbery in Southeast Asia has shown that the people involved in piracy and 
other illegal activity at sea in Southeast Asia are often the same, even though 
the offences involved might be different. They range from local fishermen or 
unemployed villagers, to the on-shore criminal infrastructure supporting 
piracy and maritime crime, and the offshore financiers, facilitators, and 
beneficiaries of such activities. Countries outside the region, like the United 
States, have tended to promote military solutions to the problems of piracy 
and sea robbery when more emphasis should probably be placed on civil law 
enforcement against maritime crime generally. 
Rather than seeing piracy and sea robbery in isolation, these crimes 
should be regarded as part of a continuum of maritime crime that also includes 
the various types of smuggling, illegal fishing, and unlawful pollution of the 
marine environment. For this reason, the prevention of maritime crime is 
primarily a matter of civil law enforcement onshore, rather than one requiring 
a military response at sea. Piracy and sea robbery attacks should be subject to 
the same criminal investigation procedures as other forms of criminal activity. 
Of course, greater efforts are required to promote cooperation to deal 
with transnational organized crime in the region. External assistance should be 
increased to assist regional countries in the following areas: 
 To improve security in ports, anchorages, and port approaches where the 
vast majority of incidents of sea robbery occur; 
 To adopt stronger measures to control trafficking in small arms and light 
weapons in the region; 
 To address governance and inter-agency coordination, particularly in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand; 
 To investigate the on-shore infrastructure supporting maritime crime, as 
well as the financing, facilitation, and beneficiaries of maritime crime; 
and 
 To resolve maritime boundaries within the region as soon as possible 
to ensure that jurisdiction might properly be exercised at sea. 
Assuming sea boundaries cannot be resolved, provisional 
arrangements for law enforcement in the disputed areas should be 
entered into on a bilateral basis and without prejudice to the boundary 
negotiations. 
The developing countries of the region, particularly the large 
archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines, lack the capacity to deal 
with maritime crime in the extensive waters under their national jurisdiction, 
including in ports and anchorages. They have other priorities of poverty 
alleviation and development and should not be encouraged to increased 
expenditure on military forces rather than on other forms of development. 
They require assistance to build their capacity to deal with maritime crime but 
this should be directed more towards civilian agencies concerned with 
maritime crime and port security rather than towards the military. Finally, 
there remains a fundamental need for international cooperation to redress the 
fundamental causes of piracy and maritime criminality in the region, such as 
depressed social conditions, poverty, and unemployment. 
 
 
